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T H E QUARTERLY 
A
 s American business grows larger, the potential losses 
from business failure become greater for both creditors 
and investors. This economic circumstance is being' ex-
perienced in a social environment characterized by an 
increasing tendency of enterprises and individuals to 
attempt to recoup losses of all kinds in the courts. And 
courts, generally, are seeming to become more liberal in 
granting redress for losses of all kinds. 
Financial distress and failure in business are increas-
ingly accompanied by searches for scapegoats. Naturally 
enough, the auditors have become favorite candidates. 
The rise in the amount of litigation against accountants 
and its possible effect on the profession are discussed in 
"The Specter of Auditors' Liability," in The Journal of 
Accountancy for September, 1965. 
It is natural for an accountant to be incredulous at the 
thought that he could be guilty of fraud in the absence 
of intentional dishonesty on his part. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this article is to describe briefly to practicing 
accountants the extent of the legal liability of an account-
ant to his client and to others in connection with his pro-
fessional services. The nature of due care, negligence, and 
fraud in the practice of accounting will be discussed, and 
the legal consequences which may follow them will be 
described. Since the article has been written for laymen 
and since a serious attempt has been made to avoid tech-
nical analysis, all legal citations and other references have 
been omitted. 
Definitions 
Basic definitions of several legal terms are set forth 
below, since these words and phrases and variations of 
them are used repeatedly in the discussion which follows. 
Actually, these few terms recapitulate much of the sub-
ject matter of the article. 
Due care and competence is that degree of care and 
competence which is reasonably expected of account-
ants, as members of a learned and skilled profession, 
in performing and reporting on professional engage-
ments. 
Negligence (or ordinary negligence) is the failure of 
an accountant to perform or report on a professional 
engagement with the due care and competence rea-
sonably expected of members of his profession. 
Gross negligence is an extreme, flagrant, or reckless 
departure from standards of due care and compe-
tence in performing or reporting on professional 
engagements—as contrasted with the thoughtless 
I slip, honest blunder, or error of judgment which 
amounts to ordinary negligence. 
\-^H*e fraud of,«d*£.ek is an intentional false represen-
tation of a material fact or opinion made to induce 
a person's reliance, and under circumstances in 
which the person justifiably does rely upon the false 
representation to his injury. The courts have said 
that an auditor commits -the fraud of deceit in issu-
ing an audit opinion if his audit has been so negli-
gent as to justify the jury or a judge in concluding 
that the auditor could have had no genuine belief 
in the truth of his opinion. Evidence of negligence, 
and especially of gross negligence, on the part of 
the auditor may be considered by the trier-of-fact in 
deciding whether the facts support or do not support 
an inference that the auditor committed deceit. Evi-
dence of heedlessness and reckless disregard of con-
sequences may be considered in deciding whether or 
not the necessary element of intention was present 
i to warrant a finding of fraud. 
Liability to client 
Accountants are members of a learned and skilled pro-
fession. Their professional status imposes an obligation to 
exercise the care and competence reasonably expected of 
persons in their profession, and to adhere to accepted 
professional standards. A similar responsibility applies to 
all professional experts, and has been described by the 
American Law Institute as follows: 
. . . If the matter is one which requires investigation, 
the supplier of the information must exercise reason-
able care and competence to ascertain the facts on 
which his statement is based. He must exercise the 
competence reasonably expected of one in his busi-
ness or professional position in drawing inferences . . . 
He must exercise reasonable care and competence in 
communicating the information so that it may be 
understood by the recipient. . . 
If a n accountant fails to exercise care and competence in 
performing and reporting on his auditing, accounting, 
tax, or management service engagements—he commits 
ordinary negligence. And he may be held liable for the 
damages resulting to his client. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
has formally defined professional standards of qualifica-
tion such as education, experience, proficiency, judgment, 
and independence. The profession has also specified cer-
tain standards and some procedures to be used in the per-
formance of and reporting upon audits. These professional 
statements of generally accepted auditing standards and 
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procedures will be given great, and perhaps decisive, 
weight in court in adjudicating liability. 
The duties and responsibilities of an auditor are also 
governed, and may properly be limited, by the contrac-
tual terms of his engagement and the representations 
in his audit report. The scope of most audit engagements 
is defined in the standard auditor's report, which consists 
of his representations—primarily of fact in the first para-
graph, and of opinion in the second.' The representations 
in the short form opinion incorporate the profession's 
auditing standards and procedures and accounting prin-
ciples, which are found in part in authoritative profes-
sional statements; in part in individual statements of 
respected writers; and in important part, in practical 
applications which are considered by an appreciable seg-
ment of the profession to be acceptable. If the scope of 
the auditor's assignment and duties is limited by the con-
tract of his employment, any such limitation must be 
clearly described in his report. 
If an auditor has performed his audit with care and 
in accordance with professional standards, he should not 
be held liable for an inaccuracy in financial statements 
which would not necessarily be detected in an examina : 
tion of the type and scope of his engagement. A court 
recently said: "Those who hire [public accountants] are 
not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only 
reasonable care and competence. They purchase service, 
not insurance . . . " For example, an auditor should not 
ordinarily be held responsible for the breakdown of an 
apparently satisfactory system of internal control because 
of collusive fraud among several persons at the top of a 
client organization, since groups of people at high levels 
have both the authority and the opportunity to contra-
vene any system of internal control—no matter how well 
designed. 
Even if the auditor has been negligent in his audit per-
formance, he should not be held liable to the client unless 
the client can prove that he suffered loss; that his loss 
was the result of the auditor's negligence; and that the 
loss did not result in part from the client's own negli-
gence in administering its business and supervising its 
employees. If, for example, an auditor recommends the 
installation of improved procedures for the protection of 
inventory and his client ignores the advice, it is difficult 
to conceive that the client would have redress against the 
auditor for failing to detect subsequent inventory losses 
which were concealed or obscured by inadequate inven-
tory controls. 
Before an accountant takes much comfort in the gen-
erality that he is not an insurer, he should, however, 
reflect that these rules are easier to state in the abstract 
than they are to apply to a set of facts with a confident 
prediction of the outcome in court. 
The crucial issues in accountant's liability lawsuits are 
usually questions of fact as to whether the accountants 
deviated from standards of due care and competence in 
the engagement, and if so, whether their deviation 
amounted to negligence, gross negligence, or fraud. These 
questions must be decided by a trier-of-fact (judge or 
jury) by applying the appropriate rules of law to the evi-
dence adduced at the trial. In so doing, the trier-of-fact 
may often be guided to a sound decision by expert 
accounting testimony and reference to the professional 
literature. Like all humans, however, triers-of-fact will be 
influenced to some extent by their own values, back-
grounds, and experience. Some triers-of-fact may begin 
the fact-finding process with ignorance, or even a serious 
misconception of the whole professional issue. For ex-
ample, some members of the public and, therefore, some 
members of a jury might wrongly assume that any error 
in an audited financial statement is a fault of the auditor. 
Moreover, a trier-of-fact has no objective means of 
detecting what specific acts of human behavior will trans-
form due care into negligence, negligence into gross negli-
gence, or gross negligence into fraud. There are no clear 
lines of demarcation between the categories. This means 
that in any close question (and most of those which are 
litigated to a conclusion are somewhat close), some triers-
of-fact might reach one conclusion (e.g., due care) and 
some another (e.g., negligence). In any given case, the 
facts and the rules of law are the same. The determination 
of the trier-of-fact is, however, decisive. The outcome of 
each case depends upon the judge's or the jury's reaction 
to and interpretation of the evidence presented, and their 
understanding and evaluation of the rules of law to be 
applied to the facts as they find them. 
This confronts the auditor with some hard questions. 
Does every mistake, every oversight, constitute negligence? 
Does every rough edge, every loose end, every management 
explanation accepted in full, every benefit of a doubt in 
favor of the client — expose the auditor to damages and 
loss of reputation? The answer should be no — if the 
standard of duty is due care and competence, and if the 
auditor is not an insurer. However, the answer may not be 
that easy if there have been losses, in view of the judicial 
fact-finding process. 
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Liability to others wider the common law — negligence 
In the United States, and until recently in England, 
the courts have generally held negligent accountants to 
be liable only to their clents—not to third parties. 
—"FirSt, the courts have concluded on pragmatic grounds 
that the hazards of public accounting practice would be 
too extreme if the commission of ordinary negligence 
(such as a thoughtless slip or blunder) were to ". . . ex-
pose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." (By 
Contrast, however, some other professionals whose ex-
posure to third persons is limited in numbers and in 
amount have been held liable to third persons for negli-
gence.) 
ISecond, the courts have said that auditors should not be 
liable for negligence to creditors and investors if their 
report ". . . was primarily for the benefit of the [client] . . . 
for use in the development of the business, and only inci-
dentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom [the 
client] and his associates might exhibit it thereafter." This 
is the primary benefit rule. It is based on the thought that 
a company ordinarily needs audited financial statements 
for many purposes — for management guidance, taxes, 
debt and equity investors, lenders, suppliers, customers — 
no single purpose alone being a decisive reason for obtain-
ing audited statements. 
Thus far the primary benefit rule has been an impor-
tant protection to auditors from liability to persons other 
than their clients for ordinary negligence. Audits have 
been held to be for the primary benefit of the client even 
in cases in which the auditor knew that his report would 
be furnished by the client, or was to be furnished by the 
auditor at the request of the client, to a third person. The 
primary benefit rule has also been invoked when it was 
known that the audit report would be used by the client 
to induce action by a third person (such as a creditor or 
an investor), and might be relied upon by that person in 
taking action. Of course, a third-party plaintiff may al-
ways attempt to prove that as a matter of fact the particu-
lar audit in his case was for the primary benefit of the 
plaintiff, rather than for the primary benefit of the client. 
In reported decisions, however, the triers-of-fact (both 
judge and jury) have ruled for the auditors on the fact 
question in such circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the existing decisions do not mean that 
there can be no such thing as an audit or a report for the 
primary benefit of someone other than the client — 
especially if the report is of a specialized nature which 
is likely to be of interest or is delivered only to a single 
person or category of persons (such as a lender), rather 
than to all of the persons interested in the financial affairs 
of the client. Consider these examples: an opinion of an 
accountant, delivered directly or indirectly to a lender, to 
the effect that in his annual audit he observed no breaches 
in the restrictions of a loan agreement; or the account-
ant's comfort letter addressed both to the client and under-
writers of its securities and delivered in fulfillment of a 
condition precedent to the obligation of the underwriters 
to purchase the securities; or special receivables audits 
required by lenders on collateralized debt. It remains to 
be established whether any of these or other special audits 
or reports are considered to be for the primary benefit of 
persons other than the client. 
Recently the primary benefit rule has been under attack 
in courts and in the literature, and there may be some 
danger of partial erosion of this protection to auditors. 
The rule was upheld and applied by the English court of 
appeal in 1951, but in the face of a strong dissent which 
argued that: (a) the duty of avoiding negligence extends 
". . . also . . . to any [specific] third person to whom [the 
auditors] themselves show the accounts, or to whom they 
know their employer is going to show the accounts so as 
to induce him to invest money or take some other action 
on them"; (b) an auditor might possibly be liable also 
". . . if he prepared his accounts for the guidance of a 
specific class of persons in a specific class of transactions"; 
(c) the auditors' duty should not, however, apply to 
strangers of whom they have heard nothing and to whom 
the client may show their accounts without their knowl-
edge or consent. 
Auditors cannot help but foresee that their reports on 
financial statements of a client will in fact be relied upon 
by existing and prospective lenders, creditors, investors, 
and other persons dealing with the client. In some cases 
the numbers of such persons may be large and their aggre-
gate commitments in the client may be great. The lan-
guage of the dissenting opinion could raise a question as 
to whether at least some of those groups are "a specific 
class of persons in a specific class of transactions" to whom 
the dissenting judge would have thought that auditors 
should be liable for negligence. 
In 1963, the dissent in the 1951 case was cited with 
approval in the Hedley Byrne case, which was ruled on by 
the highest court of England. That case did not involve a 
report of auditors, but rather an accommodation credit 
report by a bank, innocently given but negligently worded, 
on which a third person relied to his damage. In their 
opinions the justices spoke variously of "special," "particu-
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lar," "direct,'" and "proximate" relationships between 
defendant and plaintiff, but the justices were unable to 
formulate a general guide as to the circumstances which 
do or do not create such a "special relationship." 
It remains to be seen whether the "special relationship*' 
concept of the Hedley Byrne decision will affect the pri-
mary benefit rule in the United States. English decisions 
sometimes, but not always, influence United States courts 
— and vice versa. No departures from the primary bene-
fit rule have been found in reported United States deci-
sions involving accountants. However, a committee of the 
well-regarded American Law Institute has recently sug-
gested, with reference to Hedley Byrne and other recent 
decisions, that the correct interpretation of the law would 
now apply a duty of care, not necessarily ". . . to the very 
large class of persons whom almost any negligently given 
information may foreseeably reach and influence," but at 
least ". . . to the comparatively small group (not neces-
sarily identified by individuals) whom the defendant 
expects and intends to influence." 
As published in The Journal of Accountancy for Octo-
ber, 1965, it is reported to be the view of legal counsel to 
the Council of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales that the Hedley Byrne principle will 
subject accountants to liability to third persons for loss 
resulting from negligence only " . . . in circumstances where 
the accountants knew or ought to have known that the 
reports, accounts, or financial statements in question were 
being prepared for the specific purpose or transaction 
which gave rise to the loss and that they would be shown 
to and relied upon by third parties in that particular con-
nection." Such a view, if confirmed by the English courts, 
might tend to limit, though not necessarily eliminate alto-
gether, the apparent disparity between the American 
primary benefit rule and the English special relationship 
rule. 
To illustrate the possible difference between the pri-
mary benefit rule and the special relationship rule, con-
sider the case of the auditor who performs a periodic audit 
and knows (as he is bound to) that his client is required 
by a loan or merger agreement to deliver financial state-
ments reported on by independent accountants. One could 
predict with some confidence that the auditor would be 
protected by the primary benefit rule against liability to 
the other party to the agreement for ordinary negligence. 
But one of the justices in Hedley Byrne said that if an 
expert or informed person ". . . takes it upon himself to 
give information or advice to, or allows his information 
or advice to be passed on to. another person who, as he 
knows or should know, will place reliance upon it, then 
a duty of care will arise." 
So if the special relationship rule should wholly or 
partly supplant the primary benefit rule in the United 
States, auditors would become exposed to liability for 
negligence to some part of the "indeterminate" class from 
which they have heretofore been protected. Thus far the 
English courts have articulated their new rule only imper-
fectly. If the United States courts were to adopt the rule 
at all, the degree of increased exposure would remain 
uncertain until the rule was applied in litigation. 
Liability to others under the common law — fraud 
Even though an auditor may not be liable to persons 
other than his client for ordinary negligence, he will be 
exposed to liability to others if the deficiencies or lapses 
in his professional work are of such magnitude that the 
issuance of his report constitutes deceit, which is one of 
the categories of fraud. 
Deceit is defined legally as the intentional misstatement 
or concealment of a material fact or opinion for the pur-
pose of inducing another to act in reliance upon it. 
An auditor who commits deceit may. be held liable to 
the persons whom he should have reason to expect to act 
or refrain from acting in reliance upon his deceit — for 
loss suffered by them in any of the types of transactions 
in which he should expect their conduct to be influenced 
by his deceit. Such a liability could extend to those among 
the potentially large number of present and prospective 
security-holders, suppliers, customers, contractors, and 
others whom the auditor should have reason to expect to 
act or to forbear to act in reliance upon the auditor's re-
port. It is a question of fact as to which of those persons 
the auditor would have a duty, varying according to the 
circumstances of different cases. One cannot predict con-
fidently how any specified question of fact would be 
decided by various triers-of-fact, except that the decisions 
would undoubtedly not be consistent. 
In any case, the exposure of the auditor to liability for 
fraud would not be limited to the relatively small group 
referred to in the preceding section who might be able to 
prove that the auditor issued his report for their "primary 
benefit," or (under the broader rule) that there was a 
"special relationship" between the group and the auditor. 
The scope of liability for deceit is broader than for negli-
gence because a deception is considered more culpable 
than mere carelessness. 
An allegation against an accountant for deceit would 
ordinarily arise in connection with his audit report. The 
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standard audit report carries the implicit representation 
that the issuer is a competent expert in auditing. 
The first paragraph of the standard report contains 
representations which are largely, though not wholly, rep-
resentations of fact. The auditor represents that he has 
examined the financial statements of a concern, in accord-
ance with generally accepted auditing standards, and by 
such auditing procedures as in his reasonable opinion were 
necessary in the circumstances. If the evidence should 
reveal significant gaps or omissions in the audit program 
or serious incompetence or carelessness of staff work or 
supervision, such facts might support an allegation that 
the statements of what was done were deceptive misrepre-
I sentations and might justify a trier-of-fact in so deciding. 
The second paragraph of the standard opinion contains 
representations of opinion that the financial statements 
present fairly the financial position and results of opera-
tion of the concern. If the evidence should suggest that the 
audit deficiencies or accounting lapses were so extensive 
that the auditor may have lacked reasonable ground for 
I believing in the accuracy of his opinion, such circum-
stances might support an allegation that the auditor's 
opinion was a deceptive misrepresentation and might 
justify the trier-of-fact in so deciding. 
As was stated in one decision: 
A representation certified as true to the knowledge 
of the accountants when knowledge there is none, 
a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on 
grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that 
there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all suffi-
cient upon which to base liability. A refusal to see 
the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if 
sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an 
inference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses 
suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In 
other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of 
consequence may take the place of deliberate inten-
tion. 
Whether or not an auditor has committed fraudulent 
misrepresentation is a factual question for the jury or 
judge, based on expert testimony and other evidence. 
Facts indicating either ordinary negligence (a blunder or 
error of judgment) or gross negligence (serious lapses in 
the coverage or review of the audit work) may be con-
sidered by the finder of fact in considering whether the 
accountant could reasonably have had a genuine belief 
in the accuracy of his report. 
Liability to others under the federal securities acts 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 deprives the 
accountant of some of his most important protections in 
suits by third persons. An accountant who certifies finan-
cial statements in a registration statement under the 
Securities Act of 1933 is subject to the liabilities of 
Section 11. 
An investor in a security registered under the act who 
can prove that the certified financial statements con-
tained an omission or misstatement of material importance 
may sue the certifying accountant for the amount of his 
loss, without being obliged to prove: 
(1) negligence or fraud by the accountant in auditing 
the statements; 
(2) reliance on the accountant's opinion (unless plain-
tiff acquired his securities after the issuer made 
generally available an earnings statement for a 
period of at least twelve months beginning after 
the effective date of the registration statement) ; 
(3) a causal relationship between the omission or mis-
statement and his loss; 
(4) a contractual relationship with the accountant, 
issuer, sellers, or underwriters. Thus, even a 
stranger purchasing the registered security in the 
open market is entitled to recover under the 
section. 
The suit would be barred by the statute of limitations, 
unless the plaintiff shows that he sued within one year 
after he discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered, the alleged omission or 
misstatement—and in any case within three years after 
the security was offered to the public. 
The accountant may escape liability if he is able to 
sustain the burden of proof that after making reasonable 
investigation, he had reasonable ground to believe that 
the financial statements certified by him contained no 
material omission or misstatement. In effect, the account-
ant will be held liable unless he can prove that he was 
not negligent. And that is indeed a rigorous standard. 
The auditor may also undertake to prove, if he can, 
that there was no causal relationship between the omis-
sion or misstatement and plaintiff's loss, or that plaintiff 
knew of the omision or misstatement when he acquired 
the security. 
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
could subject accountants to liability for loss to persons 
who purchased or sold securities in reliance upon finan-
cial statements containing material misstatements or 
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omissions certified by the accountants and filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission under the act on 
such forms as 8-K and 10-K. Under this section, the 
plaintiff must prove reliance upon the omission or mis-
statement, and although privity (a contract relationship) 
is no requisite and plaintiff need not prove negligence or 
fraud by the accountant, the accountant is entitled to 
prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge 
that the statement was false or misleading. It therefore 
appears that under the 1934 Act the standards of liability 
are probably similar or equivalent to those of fraud under 
the common law (and, accordingly, are less stringent than 
under the 1933 Act) . If so, the legal exposure of account-
ants to liability to third persons may not be significantly 
increased, as a practical matter, by this provision of the 
1934 Act. 
State Laws 
No attempt was made for the purpose of this summary 
to search the securities and other statutes of 50 states for 
provisions imposing statutory liability on accountants. A 
brief check of secondary sources suggests that there may 
be very little in the way of state statutes which specifically 
impose liability on accountants for negligence, or of more 
general state statutes which have been applied to impose 
liability on accountants for negligence. Nonetheless, fed-
eral and state securities laws contain fraud provisions 
which are broad enough to apply to an accountant if his 
activities are such as to involve him as a participant in a 
fraudulent sale or purchase of securities. And, there is 
extensive state legislation on the licensing, regulating, and 
disciplining of accountants. 
The above summary suggests that despite important 
defenses, practicing accountants have an extensive and 
probably increasing degree of exposure to clients and 
others arising from their accounting and auditing serv-
ices. The damage to an accountant's purse can be severe. 
The damage to his reputation can be irreparable. The 
emotional cost of involvement can be deadly. 
This article has been written primarily to describe the 
risk, rather than to prescribe for it. But there are two 
things which accountants should do, one of them com-
paratively minor and the other all-important. 
Accountants should become more conscious of the 
degree of responsibility which they are assuming to per-
sons other than their clients, for which they may be re-
ceiving no commensurate fee. When called upon to fur-
nish special reports or other information to third persons, 
accountants should seriously consider insisting on a stipu-
lation that such reports are furnished without responsi-
bility to persons other than their client, or they should 
incorporate a disclaimer of responsibility to third persons 
in each such report. 
More importantly, accountants must redouble their 
vigilance in the performance of their work. They must 
assure that the work performed by their professional staffs 
is of the highest quality at all levels. They must assure 
that the supervision and review of staff work is adequate 
to detect deficiencies, and that technical competence is 
complemented with mature business judgment. This is 
the surest and the most direct way to minimize the risk 
of liability to clients and others. 
* * * 
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